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Securing by design
CYNTHIA WEBER AND MARK LACY*
Abstract. This article investigates how modern neo-liberal states are ‘securing by design’ –
harnessing design to new technologies in order to produce security, safety, and protection.
We take a critical view toward ‘securing by design’ and the policy agendas it produces of
‘designing out insecurity’ and ‘designing in protection’ because securing by design strategies
rely upon inadequate conceptualisations of security, technology, and design and inadequate
understandings of their relationships to produce inadequate ‘security solutions’ to ready-
made ‘security problems’. This critique leads us to propose a new research agenda we call
Redesigning Security. A Redesigning Security Approach begins from a recognition that the
achievement of security is more often than not illusive, which means that the desire for
security is itself problematic. Rather than encouraging the design of ‘security solutions’ – a
securing by design – a Redesigning Security Approach explores how we might insecure
securing by design. By acknowledging and then moving beyond the new security studies
insight that security often produces insecurity, our approach uses design as a vehicle through
which to raise questions about security problems and security solutions by collaborating
with political and critical design practitioners to design concrete material objects that
themselves embody questions about traditional security and about traditional design
practices that use technology to depoliticise how technology is deployed by states and
corporations to make us ‘safe’.
Cynthia Weber is Professor of International Politics at the University of Sussex and
Co-Director of the Media Company Pato Productions. She is the author of numerous books
and articles on sovereignty, intervention, US foreign policy, feminism, post-structuralism,
and film. She currently has two research projects underway – a Critical Design and Security
project on Design and Citizenship and a filmmaking/gallery exhibition project called ‘“I am
an American”: Video Portraits of Unsafe US Citizens’.
Mark Lacy is Lecturer in International Relations at Lancaster University. His recent
publications include The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power and Foreign
Policy (co-edited with Francois Debrix: Routledge, 2009) and essays in Security Dialogue,
Geopolitics, and The Handbook of New Security Studies (edited by Peter Burgess;
co-authored with Cynthia Weber: Routledge, 2010). His book in preparation is on the
politics of security in the work of Paul Virilio (Routledge, forthcoming).
The Volvo XC90: Its [sic] not just the performance that’s been fine-tuned. Inside
Leather-faced sports upholstery with R-DESIGN logo, unique instrument dials, sports
floor mats and aluminium sports pedals put you in no doubt this is a car that means
* Thanks to Adrian MacKenzie who worked with us on the New Sciences of Protection: Designing
Safe Living Programme at Lancaster University, out of which this research project took shape.
Thanks also to the many participates in this programme at Lancaster University and beyond,
especially designer Fiona Raby and her students from the Design Interactions Programme at the
Royal College of Art and designer Robert Ransick, and to Francois Debrix and two anonymous
referees for their helpful comments on this article.
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business [. . .] So if you live your life in the eye of the storm then a Volvo XC90 is the
ultimate piece of survival equipment.1
This is a sample of the advertisement for Volvo’s R-Design car line. As one
reviewer of the car noted, ‘Theres [sic] a very good car underneath and with
R-Design, its [sic] one that younger buyers will feel more inclined to discover.’2
Indeed, the car underneath all this R-Design is the very same car Volvo sells in its
S-line. The only diﬀerence is ‘cosmetic enhancements, upgraded interior trim and
minor performance upgrades’.3 The result is an R-Designed Volvo that is sold to
sporty 30-somethings as ‘Designer Survival Equipment’.4 By transforming a Volvo
S-line car into ‘Designer Survival Equipment’, the R-Designed Volvo exemplifies
how design is deployed not just to make a product fashionable but to make a
product appear to be safe. When you buy an R-Designed Volvo, you are not just
buying a car. You are also buying into the idea of the ‘consumption of
protection’,5 where design, technology, and security meet to make ‘securing by
design’ possible, either superficially (as in the case of the R-Designed Volvo) or
more profoundly (through the re-imagination and re-engineering of productions,
services, and systems of security, safety, and protection).6
Securing by design is a strategy pursued as much by states as it is by
corporations. Indeed, the ‘secured by design’ project is the UK’s ‘oﬃcial Police
flagship’ initiative to encourage individuals and organisations to ‘design out
insecurity’ and ‘design in protection’ by drawing upon innovative technologies and
design solutions.7 What is interesting about many of these new ‘secured by design’
objects and services is that they do not necessarily focus on traditional security
concerns like designing shields or bunkers or tank-like vehicles like the Volvo
R-Design XC90.8 Instead, they focus on connectivity, tagging, and personal ‘body
armor’ – wearable security that combines everyday objects with new technologies
of protection and that blends into everyday life as seamlessly as modern accessories
like mobile phones and digital watches.9 For example, one product recommended
1 SMW Belfast, ‘Volvo Advertizement’, {http://dealerpages.volvocars.se/uk/en/dealerpages/2088/
51332F303820566F6C766F2058433930.aspx} accessed on 1 July 2009.
2 Steve Walker, ‘Volvo S40 R-Design, {http://uk.cars.yahoo.com/car-reviews/car-and-driving/volvo-s40-
r-design-1005807.html}, accessed on 1 July 2009.
3 Ralph Hanson, ‘Volvo sports Line to be Called R-design’ (2007), {http://www.motorauthority.com/
volvo-sports-line-to-be-called-r-design.html} on 1 July 2009.
4 SMW Belfast, ‘Volvo Advertizement’.
5 Paul Virilio, Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles (New York: Semiotexte, 1990), p. 61.
6 In light of the dual challenges to the car industry of the economic downturn begun in 2008 and
on-going environmental concerns, the car industry is increasingly moving away from the design of
gas guzzlers security vehicles like the consumer-marketed Hummer SUV to economically and
environmentally eﬃcient cars like those with hybrid engines, which promise to secure drivers over
the longer term because they do less damage to the environment. In this way, securing by design can
be linked not only to military-inspired models and technologies but also by environmental design
and ‘green governance’ which, as Tim Luke points out, be just as much about image as they are
about protection. See Matthew Paterson and Simon Dalby, Automobile Politics: Ecology and cultural
political economy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and Timothy W. Luke,
‘Hyper-Power or Hype-Power? The USA after Kandahar, Karbala, and Katrina’, in Francois Debrix
and Mark Lacy (eds), The Geopolitics of American Insecurity (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 1–17.
7 {www.securedbydesign.com}; also see Mark J. Lacy, ‘Designer Security: MoMA’s Safe: Design Takes
on Risk and Control Society’, Security Dialogue, 39:2–3 (2008), pp. 333–57.
8 Michael Sorkin (ed.), Indefensible Space: The architecture of the national security state (London:
Routledge, 2008).
9 Paula Antonelli, ‘Grace Under Pressure’, in Paola Antonelli (ed.), Safe: Design Takes on Risk (New
York: MoMA, 2005), pp. 9–15.
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by the ‘secured by design’ project is designed to secure children on the go. It is the
‘Tag n Go’, a bright and playful-looking emergency device for children: ‘The basis
of each Tag n Go solution is a silicon wrist brand which works in conjunction with
a mobile phone. Each product is simple to implement, highly eﬃcient, and brings
peace of mind to those who use it’ by simplifying the process whereby children in
an emergency are put in touch with family and carers.10
Securing by design, then, multiplies the aspects of life that can be ‘secured’ and
multiplies the possibilities for how a security device can be presented, how it looks
or feels, and how it can be deployed by both corporations and states. This does
not mean that these designs actually fulfil their promises to provide increased
security, safety, and protection to consumers and citizens. Rather, Tag n Go and
the R-Designed Volvo may well just be symptomatic of the perceived failures of
neo-liberal states to provide their citizens with adequate protection, whether these
threats are military (like the threat of nuclear proliferation) or economic (like the
consequences of the crisis in the financial system that became apparent in 2008).
Attempts at securing by design may also reflect the fear and paranoia of the
aﬄuent in ‘tame zones’11 of ‘dangerous classes’, leading the aﬄuent to seek
protection in gated communities constructed by corporations or in civil-liberty-
sacrificing national security agendas and regional orders constructed by states.12
And so as much as consumers and citizens desire safety and protection,
corporations and states attempt to fulfil their desires by securing by design (or at
least to appear to be securing by design) by using innovative technology and slick
designs to come up with more and more inventive security solutions.
All of this is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, the state is socially
contracted to provide security to its citizens, yet insecurity both haunts the state’s
ability to achieve security (an always elusive goal) and haunts what the state uses
to mobilise its citizenry as anxious, uncertain, and desiring of state protection.13 On
the other hand, as new and unexpected threats and risks proliferate in contem-
porary life, modern citizens expect and demand increased levels of security,
protection and comfort in all aspects of life – not just traditional military security
but also transport, finance, health, and home – to a level that would have been
unimaginable to past generations. The Volvo Ad is one example of how
corporations are responding to this desire for protection. UK public policies that
promise to ‘design out insecurity’ and ‘design in protection’ through a broad-based
‘secured by design’ agenda illustrate how states are doing the same.
Such strategies of securing by design hold the promise of delivering increased
security, safety, and protection by using new and experimental technologies to
‘technologically fix’ security problems. Mobile technologies like cell phones,
10 {www.tagngo.co.uk}.
11 Timothy W. Luke, ‘New World Order or Neo-World Orders: Power, Politics and Ideology in
Informationalizing Glocalities’, in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Roberston (eds),
Global Modernities (London: Sage, 1995).
12 Luke, ‘Hyper-Power’ and Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1998).
13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1660/2008); R. B. J. Walker,
Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992); Paul Virilio, Popular Defense; Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Engin F. Isin, ‘The Neurotic Citizen’, Citizenship Studies, 8 (2004),
pp. 217–35.
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biotechnologies like cloning, and nanotechnologies like nanobots all feature in
corporate and state designs for ‘safe living’. Yet each technological solution is
potentially as insecuring as it is securing. For example, architectural critic Beatriz
Colomina points out that those objects that were designed to make our everyday
lives more liveable are being redeployed to take human life. As Colomina puts it,
‘If 9/11 in New York revealed the cell-phone as the last vestige of domesticity, 3/11
in Madrid revealed the cell-phone as a weapon, triggering the bombs in the
trains.’14 Similarly, radical philosopher Jacques Derrida argues that nanotechnolo-
gies are potentially ‘so much more powerful and invisible, uncontrollable, capable
of creeping everywhere’ that ‘our unconscious already knows it, and that’s what’s
scary’.15 Even those invisible technologies of networked society that we have got
used to continue to create unintended consequences for societies around the planet.
As designers Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby note, the electromagnetic spectrum
has become the ‘central nervous system’ of our modern lives by not just enabling
communication and connection but also surveillance, detection, and disconnec-
tion.16 While new technologies definitely oﬀer us some new material levels of
security and safety compared to the past, they also insecure us physically, socially,
and psychologically in increasingly new and complicated ways.17 New technologies
often increase our sense of anxiety at the same time as they promise to deliver us
from insecurity. And this often fuels our desire to secure ourselves and our states
by designing out insecurity and designing in protection. The dilemma, of course,
is that because of the complex relationships between security and insecurity,
security and safety, and security, safety, and design, these ‘design solutions’ can
create as much insecurity and danger as they eliminate.
As scholars interested in contemporary security issues, we are asking questions
about how design is being used to respond to real and imagined new insecurities
and dangers and what new insecurities and dangers these ‘design solutions’ in turn
create. Our understanding of design can be traced to both its etymology and its
elaboration by design theorists. Etymologically, design refers to the process of
marking out, indicating, or designating, as well as to the products of design and
the eﬀects of design. Design can mark something out as prestigious (how design is
used to describe modern fashion or modern medical breakthroughs like ‘designer
drugs’), or design can mark something or someone out as unworthy of inclusion
(how states design systems of rights, privileges and benefits for its citizens that
mark out non-citizens as excluded and unworthy).18 In design theory, design is
described as a ‘language of things’19 that enables the manipulation of technologies,
14 Beatrice Colomina, Domesticity at War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), p. 302.
15 Jacques Derrida, ‘Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides – A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida’,
in Giovanna Borradori (ed.), Philosophy In A Time of Terror (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2003), p. 102.
16 Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby, Design Noir: The secret life of electronic objects (Basel:
Birkhauser, 2001), pp. 15–8; Anthony Dunne, Hertzian Tales: Electronic Productions, Aesthetic
Experience, and Critical Design (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Stephan Trüby, Exit-
Architecture: Design Between War and Peace (New York: Springer Wien, 2008).
17 John Thackera, In the Bubble: Designing In A Complex World (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press,
2006).
18 Imogen Tyler, ‘Designed to Fail’, Citizenship Studies 14:1 (2010), pp. 61–74; and Cynthia Weber,
special issue on Design and Citizenship, Citizenship Studies, 14:1 (2010).
19 Deyan Sudjic, The Language of Things (London: Allen Lane, 2008). Also see Roland Barthes,
Mythologies (London: Vintage, 1993), and Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects (London: Verso,
1996).
1024 Cynthia Weber and Mark Lacy
materials, colors, forms, and space to create diﬀerent emotional and behavioral
responses: eﬃciency, docility, desire, luxury, comfort, protection, fear, power,
indiﬀerence. Design as a language of things shapes everything from the most
mundane objects – such as a kitchen knife or bottle opener or ballot paper –
through to more complex experiences and processes, such as the design of a
technology and process that enfolds our bodies with pleasure and security (how we
might feel in our new R-DESIGN Volvo XC-90 car) or enfolds our bodies with
discomfort and insecurity (how we might feel when we are subjected to the
processes of hyper-surveillance at state border-crossings). Our investigation of
design in relation to security is located at the rich intersections between design as
a practice of marking out, indicating, and designating and design as a ‘language of
things’ that – through the creation of tangible and intangible products, processes,
and experiences – intentionally and unintentionally infuses security discourse with
complex systems of meaning and power.
As we ask critical questions about design and security, then, one of our central
questions is this: How might we interrupt the seduction of politicians by
technological fixes and by supposedly eﬃcient design solutions to complex social,
economic, and political problems? Certainly, governments are not going to stop
marshalling the latest scientific expertise to try to make their citizens safer, nor
should they. But we have concerns about how government desires for quick
solutions, new technologies that promise these solutions at some future date, and
designer expertise that makes these solutions salable to citizens now mix into what
for us in an uncomfortable and potentially dangerous new agenda for ‘designing
safe living’,20 an agenda that is being realised today with a very specific vision of
tomorrow in mind.
This potentially dangerous new agenda for designing ‘safe living’ cannot be
adequately interrogated from within a traditional security studies perspective. This
is because of how traditional security studies understands security, technology,
design, and their relationships to one another and to the state. From a traditional
security studies perspective, ‘security’ is typically about employing innovative
problem-solving approaches on behalf of the state to find the most eﬃcient and
eﬀective answers to how we might best achieve state security, without asking
uncomfortable questions about how something gets designated/designed as a
‘problem’ and a ‘solution’, by whom, and on whose behalf – without asking, in
other words, how ontopolitical assumptions circulate in the security imaginary
rhetorically and materially.21 While state-sponsored security experts provide what
they see as the political/security problem and motivation for a security solution, it
is technological innovation that holds the promise of solving these ‘security
problems’. From this perspective, technological innovation is understood as a
process where inevitable accidents and flaws in a design drive the future refinement
and progress of our state’s and society’s ability to provide security.22 Finally,
20 Our interest in ‘designing safe living’ has its roots in our earlier work on ‘The Aesthetics of Fear’
that grew into a programme we jointly ran with Adrian Mackenzie through the Institute of
Advanced Studies at Lancaster University during the 2007–2008 academic year called ‘New Sciences
of Protection: Designing Safe Living’. For more information about this programme and the issues
it raised, see the programme website at: {http://www.lancs.ac.uk/ias/annualprogramme/protection/}
and see the program blog at: {http://safeliving.wordpress.com/}.
21 William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
22 Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 24.
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‘design’ is where traditional security agendas, ever more powerful new technologies,
and imagination meet to produce defense, safety, and security on behalf of the
state (not to mention profit on behalf of corporations).23
From a traditional security studies perspective, then, design is the creative link
between preconceived state-sponsored ‘security problems’ and newly conceived
‘technological fixes’ to these problems. It is where imaginative problem-solving
melds technology into a specific solution to a specific state-sponsored security
problem by putting aesthetics in the service of policing and security24 in an often
centralised, authoritative, and top-down fashion. If it is successful, design does
more than just imagine and manufacture state security solutions. It imagines and
manufactures solutions in a manner that makes them acceptable, liveable and
essential for our security of a state and its citizens, with the eﬀect of depoliticising
security, technology, design, and their relationships.25 Design, then, is a space in
which the political messiness of insecurity is reduced, stylised, and made ready to
sell by sovereign nation-states, corporations, and public policymakers to everyday
citizens and consumers as a slick, seductive, eﬀective, and politically neutral
product, service or assemblage.
Even so, the desire to ‘secure by design’ can trigger what Jacques Derrida
understands as the auto-immunity response of the state. Confronted with insecu-
rities that circulate inside the state, an auto-immune response kicks in, which often
results in self-destructive (for example, the US-lead war in Iraq) or even suicidal
policies and, we would add, spectacles of security and control designed to make a
citizenry feel reassured (such as certain practices in airports that are more about
responding to public anxieties rather than genuine measures to make people
safer).26 In this sense, attempts to ‘secure by design’ can over-intensify the areas of
our bodies and lives that can be secured, turning our ‘First World’, industrialised
states into the endo-colonised spaces Paul Virilio writes about as ‘laboratories of
the future’.27 This is among the many unintended consequences of ‘securing by
design’.28
As a result, design – whether successful or unsuccessful – can make security
policies and practice seem to be more necessary, to the point that ‘securing by
design’ becomes acceptable and even seductive to citizens and consumers as well as
to states and corporations. However, instead of design functioning to smooth over
the messiness of political life on behalf of the state or a seemingly benevolent
23 This is what is known in the literature on safety and design as the principle of ‘reverse risk
compensation. See Donald A. Norman, The Design of Future Things (New York: Basic Books, 2007).
24 The Igmade Collective (eds), 5 CODES: Architecture, Paranoia and Risk In Times of Terror (Basel:
Birkhäuser, 2006).
25 Cynthia Weber, ‘Introduction: Design and Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, 14:1 (2010), pp. 1–16.
26 Bruce Schneier, Schneier on Security (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008); also see Cynthia Weber and Mark
Lacy, ‘Orange Alert’ (2004), short film available at: {http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/politics/events/
security%20bytes/orangealertwm.htm} accessed on 1 July 2009.
27 For Virilio, endo-colonisation is something that occurs in spaces like South American and Africa,
but we would argue a biopolitics of control applied to North America and Europe (particularly in
urban geographical areas) is transforming these spaces into ‘laboratories of the future’ as well. See
Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics (Los Angeles: Semiotexte, 2006). Also see Eyal, Hollow Land: Israel’s
Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2007); Mike Davis, Buda’s Wagon: A Brief History of
the Car Bomb (London: Verso, 2007); Stephen Graham (ed.), Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards
An Urban Geopolitics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
28 For a general discussion of unintended consequences in relation to design, see Dunne and Raby,
Design Noir.
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corporation and render the security/technology relationship depoliticalised, the
imaginative space of design in which security and technology meet can be
mobilised to explore not only the operations of power and control in the present
but also to open up innovative and often troubling questions about the future
consequences of new technologies in times of ‘hype’29 about the promise of
‘designing out insecurity’. A critical attitude toward design can illuminate the
taken-for-granted assumptions, values, and projects designed into traditional
security/technology/design relationships and throw them into doubt by raising
questions like ‘Why has this specific relationship between security and technology
been designed?’; ‘What are the political and economic projects inherent in this
security/technology relationship?’; ‘Who does this design empower, and who does
it disempower?’; and ‘What would its application mean for how we might live?’
From this critical perspective, then, design no longer necessarily functions as
(just) an imaginative problem-solving space. Instead, design functions as an
imaginative problem-making space, where concerns about the security/technology
relationship can be rethought and reconfigured. In this way, design becomes a form
of ‘critical design’.30 And what is designed in this space of critical design are not
techno-rational solutions to pre-given security problems but a whole range of
political, social, and ethical questions/problems about how design works techno-
rationally, techno-socially, and techno-psychically,31 particularly in relation to how
states and corporations attempt to design safe living presumably for their citizens
and consumers but mainly for themselves.32
Redesigning security
It is precisely design’s potential to critically interrupt a traditional security/
technology relationship that interests us. But how specifically can design be
mobilised to enable a critical study of security? How can we apply the ideas,
techniques, and methodologies of critical design to interrupt the often taken-for-
granted relationship between security and technology? And, importantly, why
should we make such a move?
One necessary move gestured toward above is to recognise that while our thinking
is grounded in IR theory, it is not confined to it. So, for example, while we are aware
that IR theory traditions like realism, neo-realism, and even some brands of construc-
tivism have long been concerned with the problem of planning for insecure and
uncertain futures, we are also aware of how these traditional approaches to IR have a
tendency to focus on traditional geopolitical insecurities like the emergence of new
Great Power peer competitors or the proliferation of nuclear capabilities.33 What this
means is that while adherents to these traditional IR approaches recognise that
security threats are proliferating, they often misrecognise the variety of sources that
29 See Luke, ‘Hyper-Power’.
30 Dunne and Raby, Design Noir.
31 Ibid., and Dunne, Hertzian Tales.
32 Cynthia Weber, ‘Designing Safe Citizens’, Citizenship Studies, 12 (2008), pp. 125–42.
33 Seán Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism (London: Palgrave, 2006); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of
International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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generate these threats, including, for example, states, their security policy doctrines,
and their plans to ‘design out insecurity’ and ‘design in protection’. Even Critical
Security Studies, with its focus on emerging political and economic threats and actors,
often falls prey to these same misrecognitions, albeit diﬀerently.34 The result is that
theorists and policymakers informed by these IR traditions all too often turn a blind
eye toward the ethico-political problems created by the uses of new technologies to
police and to secure everyday life.35
With this in mind, we propose to outline a new research agenda we call
Redesigning Security. A Redesigning Security Approach begins from a recognition
that the achievement of security is more often than not illusive, which means that
the desire for security is itself problematic. Rather than encouraging the design of
traditional ‘security solutions’ – a securing by design – a Redesigning Security
Approach explores how we might insecure security by design. In other words, this
approach uses design as a vehicle through which to raise questions about security
problems and security solutions by designing concrete material objects that
themselves embody questions about traditional security and about traditional
design practices that use technology to depoliticise how technology is deployed by
states and corporations to make us ‘safe’.
Thinking about security problems and design through a Redesigning Security
Approach provides an alternative to traditional IR approaches to security and
design and to their relationships to technology. In so doing, it oﬀers concrete ways
to critically re-examine some of the abstract security threats and futures some
realist, neo-realist, constructivist, and critical security scholars have identified. For
by engaging with policy initiatives seeking to secure by design and engaging with the
design world in all its complexity and diversity, this approach not only maps and
problematises the rapidly changing messy terrain of bodies, gadgets, buildings,
materials, technologies and desires. It also contributes to making visible the political
and ethical assumptions bound up in tradition design ‘solutions’ oﬀered by some IR
scholars and policymakers as well as the technologies these ‘solutions’ are based
upon. In so doing, it opens up a new series of questions about the future of security,
design, and technology and the future of their relationship ethically and politically.
Before we elaborate this new research agenda more fully, we first want to
explain why we think it is important to rethink traditional, critical, and new
securities through critical design. To do this, we have chosen a number of examples
that highlight the need to rethink contemporarily-designed policy problems and
solutions ethically and politically, beginning with the problem of circulation.
The problem of circulation
It has long been the case that the perception, emergence, and/or creation of new
dangers has lead policymakers to turn to designers for technological fixes to
security problems. What tends to be ‘new’ in this combination of new dangers, new
34 For a discussion of both the possibilities and limits of Critical IR Theory, see Elizabeth Dauphinee
and Cristina Masters, The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror (London: Palgrave, 2007); and
Burgess, Handbook of New Security Studies.
35 Mark Lacy, ‘Intellectuals, International Relations and the Constant Emergency’, Cambridge Review
of International Aﬀairs (forthcoming).
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securities, and new designs are what needs to be managed and what technological
form design ‘solutions’ to management ‘problems’ take. As intellectuals like Michel
Foucault and Paul Virilio argue, in modernity states have turned increasingly
complex flows of ‘circulation’ into a management problem that states must
administer and control.36 And so policymakers and designers have long been
collaborating on how to ‘design out insecurities’ and ‘design in protection’ with
respect to circulation. But what circulates, how it circulates, where it circulates,
why it circulates, and at what speed it circulates have all been changing. So finding
the balance between making life liveable and making life safe is an on-going
challenge for states, for citizens, and for designers.
In works like Speed and Politics and Security, Territory, Population, Paul Virilio
and Michel Foucault respectively make a seemingly obvious point about the world
we live in – that this world is only possible due to the complex forms of circulation
that surround us, be these the circulation of money, goods, food, machines, armies,
diseases, animals, or ideas. As such, circulation is vital to modern life and to
modern living. Yet unregulated circulation is often perceived by states as a security
problem. So states (often collaborating with designers and architects) step in to
carefully and ‘cost-eﬀectively’ manage circulation. As Virilio and Foucault note,
these management strategies are always political because they are always infused
with the interests and desires of states.
Even so, some regulations on circulation seem to be unproblematic. For
example, if we were allowed to drive our automobiles as fast as we wanted to, then
fatalities on the roads would most likely increase. So it makes good sense to have
enforced speed limits.37 Yet other regulations are far more problematic. For
example, many states currently justify the management of their territorial borders
by arguing that if the global circulation of people crossing borders were
unregulated, then some countries would be ‘swamped’ with undocumented bodies
that states claim threaten their economy, security, and health.38
States, then, face a predicament – how can states address the desires of their
citizens for the accelerated mobility that modern circulatory systems can provide
while at the same time putting in place controls devised to manage circulation that
do not unduly irritate or impede the circulatory systems their citizens reply upon.
One way is for states to regulate the speed of circulation. For example, the speed
of the economic circulation of goods and services might be increased (through, for
example, the quicker delivery of goods ordered online) while the speed of human
circulation may be decreased at international borders to allow states to interrogate
those people and packages whose transit the state may want to inhibit (whether
they threaten to import disease, unemployment, or terror).
The management and control of circulation often relies upon ‘low-tech’
solutions, like speed bumps placed on roads or paper passports at border crossings.
36 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collége De France 1977–1978
(London: Palgrave, 2007); Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics; Benjamin Bratton, ‘Introduction:
Logistics of Habitable Circulation’, in Paul Virilio (ed.), Pure War (Los Angeles: Semiotexte, 2006),
pp. 7–25; Julian Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity, and
the Defense of Logistic Societies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).
37 For an alternative perspective, see Norman, The Design of Future Things.
38 Roxanne Doty, Anti-Immigratism in Western Democracies (New York: Routledge, 2003); Roxanne
Doty, The Law Into Their Own Hands: Immigration, and the politics of exceptionalism (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 2009).
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Yet as we move from a geopolitical to a metro-political era,39 increasingly powerful
technologies are becoming part of our everyday lives, in part because our daily
lives are constantly recontextualised through old dangers like crimes perpetrated by
‘dangerous classes’ and new dangers like threats created by ‘terrorist networks’.
This has the eﬀect of increasing the number of products designed to protect our
bodies and property from crime and terrorism through new ‘networked’ tech-
nology, smart materials, or biometric technologies like domestic surveillance,
knife-proof clothing, or fingerprint activated laptops. At the same time, these
technologies enable new ways of monitoring the circulation of people and products
while making circulation faster, more eﬃcient, and more individualised by using
everything from RFid devices to ‘responsive environments’ of the sort seen in films
like Minority Report.40 In these ways, states attempt to ‘design out’ uncertainties,
insecurities, and inconveniences while they ‘design in protection’.
Many of these designs have a connection to the military or the militarised
mentality that modern citizens live with(in). For example, because the attainment
of security seemed elusive for Cold War citizens, one of the prevailing imaginaries
and technologies of ‘safe living’ during this period in US/Soviet history was for
citizens to barricade themselves against a nuclear attack. On a low-tech level,
school children were trained to ‘duck and cover’ when they saw a nuclear flash; on
a high-tech level, nuclear shelters were built into backyards and mountain sides. In
our contemporary world, though, moving around is often seen as safer than being
a sitting duck (covered or not). As design theorist Susan Yelavich explains, ‘In the
end, mobility appeared the better course than perpetual internment [like in a
nuclear fall-out shelter], and the shelter became just another decoy.’41 So new
designs like Kosuke Tsumara’s Final Home Jacket – a garment designed as a
‘nomadic home’ in times of disaster – were created that could protect mobile
citizens from mobile dangers, something that makes more sense in our post-Cold
War, post-9/11 era.
As Tsumara’s Final Home Jacket illustrates, our relationships to everyday
objects change when our military imaginaries and technologies change. The
German designer and social theorist Stephan Trüby elaborates on this point:
With the advent of the new wars ‘things’ have moved into our field of awareness more than
ever before. An array of low-tech products such as rucksacks, carpet knives, soles of shoes,
containers for liquids and so on have for some time now posed a considerable threat. Also
high-tech products like iPods and other gadgets are inconceivable without the power of
innovation which is to improve a MOUT (Israeli ‘Military Operations in Urbanized
Terrains’) agent’s or IDF (Israel Defence Forces) soldier’s chances of survival.42
Trüby also notes that many ‘marketable design products’ (such as the R-Designed
Volvo, for example) often have ‘a very close resemblance to military artifacts’,43 as
39 Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics.
40 Bruce Sterling, Shaping Things (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005); Cynthia Weber,
‘Securitizing the Unconscious: The Bush Doctrine of Preemption and Minority Report’, Geopolitics,
10 (2005), pp. 1–18; Lucy Bullivant, Responsive Environments: Architecture, Art and Design,
(London: V & A Publications, 2006).
41 Susan Yelavich, ‘Safety Nets’, in Paola Antonelli (ed.), SAFE: Design Takes on Risk (Museum of
Modern Art: New York, 2005), pp. 17–25.
42 Stephan Trüby, Exit-Architecture, p. 92.
43 Ibid., p. 59.
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if the militarisation of the product provides emotional security and comfort from
a dangerous world.44
In addition to the everyday objects that we do see, there are everyday electronic
impulses circulating through our environments and our bodies that we don’t see –
things like radio waves or micro waves that have their own spectral geography.
These electromagnetic impulses make the circulation and exchange of data possible
without us necessarily being aware of their invisible movements as they happen, yet
we respond to them all the time – through broadcasts we watch, products we use
to heat our food, and haptics (technologies that use touch to interface).45 We are
not just surrounded but permeated by these electromagnetic impulses, as we rely
upon them to circulate the signals of modern life. Sometimes these signals have to
do with security. In the US, for example, television viewers are familiar with the
Emergency Broadcasting System that tests whether or not radio and television
signals could be transmitted during a national emergency. A more playful recent
example is FutureFarmers’ Homeland Security Blankets. ‘Each blanket is wirelessly
networked to the internet and responds to the Homeland Security Acts fluxuating
(sic) Color coded “Threat Levels”. As a means to “disseminate information”, these
blankets disseminate temperature change and an indicating light which alerts the
user of the current threat and comforts them accordingly.’46
What designs like the Homeland Security Blanket illustrate are how designers
make security intelligible and accessible to us and liveable for us, often through
everyday objects that provide both information and comfort.47 But the Homeland
Security Blanket does something else. It also makes us hyperaware of the invisible
electromagnetic security-space we occupy and that occupies us. As such, it
embodies two critiques of what attempts to ‘design out insecurity’ and ‘design in
protection’ do in our daily lives.
One critique suggests that these new technologies are themselves merely hype,
designed to first make everyday citizens aware of what their states designate as
dangers and then to make citizens feel comforted by their state’s ability to provide
them with ‘safety’. While states are very accomplished at achieving their first goal
of instilling fear in their citizens, they are less good at providing actual protection
and safety. For as Mike Davis writes in his history of the car bomb, ‘Although
science writers like to fantasize about “vast networks of imaging or trace sensors
deployed through cities,” such Orwellian systems, if they actually become available,
will probably be too expensive to find widespread use, especially in poorer
countries.’48 In other words, the technologies we may really need to keep us safe
from in our modern systems of circulation do not yet exist, and if they did exist,
they would unlikely to be available to those who need them.
‘Security’, as the anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom suggests, might be little
more than a trompe l’oeil – a fooling of the eye – than a lived reality. She comes
to this conclusion based on her research on US shipping ports. While she confesses
44 Elaine Cardenas and Ellen Gorman, The Hummer: Myths and Consumer Culture (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2007).
45 P. W. Singer, Wired For War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (London: The
Penguin Press, 2009), p. 69.
46 Future Farmers, ‘Homeland Security Blanket’ (2008), {http://www.futurefarmers.com/survey/homeland.
php} accessed on 1 July 2009.
47 Antonelli, SAFE, p. 15.
48 Davis, Buda’s Wagon, p. 191.
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to being lulled into a ‘sense of security well-being’ by the ‘formal’ voice of
security,49 she cannot escape the conclusion of her research that if ‘you want to
believe in security, don’t visit ports. A journey to these borderlands shows that
security is an illusion. The notion of security is the magicians trick: smoke and
mirrors, with a good dose of mis/direction.’50
Yet the mere possibility that these technologies of surveillance, control and
protection might exist and could function leads to a second critique of the
security/technology relationship, which is that new technologies introduce new
dangers into our daily lives rather than (as promised) eliminate new dangers. This
position is shared by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. In his short essay
‘No to Bio-political Tattooing’ published in Le Monde in January 2004, Agamben
explains why he cancelled a course he was meant to teach at New York University
later that year. For Agamben, the fact that his visa and fingerprints would be
placed on a file is an example of the state’s control of circulation reaching
‘previously unimaginable levels’. Practices once considered inhumane or excep-
tional, designed for the control of ‘dangerous classes’, are becoming normalised,
contributing to what Agamben sees as the progressive ‘animalization of man’,
noting that tattooing at Auschwitz ‘undoubtedly seemed the most normal and
economic way to regulate the enrollment of deported persons into concentration
camps’.51 So whereas Davis and Nordstrom view the use of new sophisticated
techniques of surveillance and control as ‘hype’, Agamben sees ‘bio-political
tattooing’ as another act of closing down the citizenry’s ‘free and active
participation in the public sphere’. And what is more, history ‘teaches us how
practices first reserved for foreigners find themselves applied later to the rest of the
citizenry’.52
All this suggests that design may well provide us with too much security and
too much convenience, which can end up making us less secure – physically,
emotionally, ethically, and politically. Making visible the ethico-political dilemmas
designed into everyday objects and processes of safety is what ethico-political and
critical designers do. In so doing, these designers help us to think about how
security-obsessed objects, architectures, and impulses not only shape our environ-
ments but shape us as contemporary subjects. As such, they present us with a
whole range of new security questions, including ‘Do we need protection from
what the state designates as “dangerous”’, or are we endangered by what the state
tells us is ‘safe’? Consider the following examples.
The first example, which addresses the flow of undocumented bodies across
international borders, is media artist/designer Robert Ransick’s Casa Segura (see
49 Carolyn Nordstrom, Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), p. 194.
50 Nordstrom, Global Outlaws, p. 191.
51 Giorgio Agamben, ‘No to Bio-political Tattooing’, Le Monde (10 January 2004), {http://www.ratical.
org/ratville/CAH/totalControl.pdf}, accessed on 1 July 2009. Gilles Deleuze has a similar concern about
the ‘animalization’ of human beings. He claims that we ‘don’t have to stray into science fiction to find
a control mechanism that can fix the position of any element at any given moment – an animal in a game
reserve, a man in a business (electronic tagging)’. See Gilles, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, in
Negotiations (New York: Columbia, 1990), p. 181. Felix Guattarri makes a similar point to these,
arguing that technologies ‘infantalize’ us as they try to protect us. Re-examined though these ideas
of othering, animalisation, and infantalisation, what Agamben observed about electronic tattooing
bears an eerie similarity to the ‘secure by design’ ‘Tag n Go’ scheme for children.
52 Agamben, ‘No to Bio-political Tatooing’.
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Image 1. Casa Segura Interiors.
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Image 1). Casa Segura (Safe House) is a small, solar-powered shed-like structure
stocked with non-perishable food and water. Designed to be located on private
land in the Sonora desert in Southern Arizona, this unmanned shack can be used
by undocumented migrants who have decided to cross this dangerous desert to try
to avoid detection by US Border Patrol agents as they journey from Mexico to the
US. Because of the harsh conditions of the Arizona desert and the general
under-preparedness of crossers to make their journey, Casa Segura’s shelter and
provisions can mean the diﬀerence between life and death. But Casa Segura is
more than just a transitional space that migrants can anonymously pass through.
For Casa Segura also houses a computer touch screen that is linked (on a time
delay) to the internet. Choosing between options ‘to draw, write messages, or make
a pictogram from a set of ready-made graphical icons’, migrants using Casa Segura
may not only mark their existence but also comment on their experience as they
make their journey.
According to Ransick, ‘[. . .] Casa Segura engages three distinct groups:
Mexican migrants crossing the border through this dangerous landscape, the
property owners whose land they cross, and members of the general public
interested in learning more about border issues and the intricate dynamics at play
in this heavily traﬃcked region’.53 In so doing, Casa Segura does not only provide
a temporary refuge and site of engagement to migrants. It also ‘provides concerned
private property owners on the border with an opportunity to create a life-saving
beacon in the desert, a platform for engaging with the anonymous individuals
crossing their land, and a non-aggressive means of protecting their homes’.54 The
overall eﬀect of this project is to make ‘manifest the compassionate choices
available to individuals who live within this highly charged border region. As an
alternative to the future militarization of the border, Casa Segura oﬀers a new
method of engagement and free exchange. Shifting away from the abstract rhetoric
of numbers, the project focuses on the anonymous – yet intimate – relationship
between a property owner and the individual migrants walking their land’.55
A second, very diﬀerent example is designers Anthony Dunne and Fiona
Raby’s Faraday Chair (see Image 2), which comes from their project Hertzian
Tales56 and addresses the flow of electromagnetic impulses, defamiliarising the
familiar in the spaces we inhabit. Unlike designer Robert Ransick’s Casa Segura
which is made to actually function in the Arizona desert, Dunne and Raby’s
Faraday Chair is a non-functioning prototype that illustrates the sort of shelter we
53 Robert Ransick, ‘Casa Segura’, {http://www.casasegura.us/?q=en/project_description} accessed on 1
July 2009.
54 Ransick, ‘Casa Segura’.
55 Ibid., also see Ransick and Weber, ‘Soon All This Will be Picturesque Ruins’, Citizenship Studies,
14:1 (2010), pp. 105–12 and Weber, ‘Design and Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, 14:1 (2010), pp.
1–16. Critics might be concerned that Casa Segura is an illustration of a techno-utopianism as much
as it is an illustration of ethico-political design, and in this respect it might become another danger
to migrants because it could oﬀer the illusion of safety (of passage, rest, or shelter) while instead
functioning as a place that further entraps the migrant. Robert Ransick is mindful of these concerns
as he considers how to make Casa Segura functional. Some responses include posting any internet
comments left by migrants on a randomised time delay so that they cannot be tracked back to
migrants at Casa Segura, not announcing where in the Arizona Desert Casa Segura will be
constructed, and being open to moving Casa Segura if it is targeted for surveillance by either US
Border Patrol or by civilian patrols like the modern-day Minutemen.
56 Dunne, Hertzian Tales.
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might actually need to keep us safe from the circulation of hidden electromagnetic
fields that surround us everywhere. The prototype is a yellowish-tinted Perspex box
large enough to house a person curled up in the foetal position. The box is elevated
on steel legs and contains an air mask for ventilation. In line with much of Dunne
and Raby’s work, the Faraday Chair asks questions about ‘the social, cultural, and
ethical impact of emerging pervasive technologies’.57 Specifically, the question
raised by the Faraday chair is if ‘[a]s electronic devises invade our houses,
wave-free spaces may be our only refuge’.58
57 Patricia Juncosa, Patricia, ‘Plate description of Dunne and Raby’s Faraday Chair’, Safe: Design
Takes on Risk. (New York: MOMA, 2005), p. 73.
58 Juncosa, ‘Plate description’, p. 73.
Image 2. Faraday Chair.
Image 3. James King’s In-Vitro Meat Project ‘Dressing the Meat of Tomorrow’.
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The final example comes from Dunne and Raby’s former student James King’s
In-Vitro Meat Project, ‘Dressing the Meat of Tomorrow’,59 a project that considers
the roles of design and technology in practices of food preparation and
consumption. King’s interest is in how existing technologies make it possible to
clone edible meat without the need to clone and then slaughter an entire animal.
This leads him to speculate on ‘how we might choose to give shape, texture and
flavour to this new sort of food in order to better remind us where it came from’.60
In his project, King designs in-vitro meat that in no way resembles the meat we
are accustomed to eating these days, meat that is a discrete part of an animal like
a leg or a breast. Instead, the meat King imagines might be served in the future
is grown in-vitro in moulds to resemble colourful (almost candy-like) cross-sections
of an animal’s inner organs, what he calls ‘MRI steaks’ (see Image 3). By playing
with ideas of taste and palatability, King’s work challenges us to think about how
existing technologies enable unforeseen relationships among humans, animals, and
food. It raises questions like: ‘Should cloning meat replace herding and slaugh-
tering animals for food?’; ‘If so, would cloning make animals safe from humans or
would more species of animals become extinct because humans don’t cultivate
them?’; ‘Is cloned meat safe for human consumption?’; ‘If so, how might cloning
meat introduce new practices of ethical eating beyond, say, vegetarianism?’; ‘And
how will designers make these developments normal and acceptable?’
Structures like Casa Segura and objects like the Faraday Chair and MRI steaks
are designed to hold social, cultural, political, and ethical values in ways that
provoke questions. By building and/or circulating these designed structures and
objects, ethico-political and critical designers are eﬀectively circulating their
questions, about the normal and the abnormal, the real and the imaginary, the
possible and the impossible. It is for this reason that critical designers sometimes
refer to their work as ‘design for debate’.61 Included in this debate are not just the
intended uses of designed objects, but also their unintended uses. For one never
really knows how an object will be used in a specific context by a specific individual
with all sorts of emotions, desires, and needs that commodified technology cannot
or will not recognise.62 Think again of Colomina’s example of the cell phone,
which was designed to enable communication and connection but which was used,
misused or abused to trigger destruction in the Madrid bombings.
Overall, what these ethico-political and critical designs do is use the imaginative
space of design in which security and technology meet to make politics, values, and
ethics visible. They do this by illuminating many taken-for-granted assumptions,
values, and utilities designed into this relationship and highlighting questions about
why a particular security/technology relationship exists, on whose behalf, for what
stated and unstated purpose, and for what intended and unintended use. In so
doing, they allow us to think political, critically, and ethically about what the
application of these everyday technologies of protection means for our ‘safe living’
right here and right now as we think about how we will live safely today and how
we will live safely in the future.
59 Paola Antonelli (ed.), Design and the Elastic Mind (New York: MoMA, 2008), p. 106.
60 James King, ‘Dressing the Meat of Tomorrow’ (2008), {http://www.james-king.net/projects/meat},
accessed on 1 July 2009.
61 Dunne and Raby, Design Noir.
62 Dunne and Raby, Design Noir.
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‘Do you want to replace the existing normal?’63
As the above discussion makes clear, the work of ethico-political and critical
designers can embody unexpected and therefore disarming critiques about the
relationship between security, technology, and design. It can do this by, in the
words of critical designer Fiona Raby, ‘replacing the existing normal’ in terms of
what design is supposed to do.64 For critical designers like Raby, what traditional
design is supposed to do is use technology to provide consumers with market-
driven systems, services, and objects that are useful as well as aesthetically pleasing
rather than raise questions about new technologies. From our new securities
perspective,65 what traditional design also does is smooth over and depoliticise the
relationship between technology and security by providing slick, sellable techno-
logical ‘solutions’ to what mainly states but also corporations and individuals
designate as security ‘problems’.
During 2007/2008, we began working with ethico-political and critical designers
to learn about the protocols and procedures of doing ethico-political and critical
design and to expose these designers to how we think about safety and security.66
Just as we would not claim any expertise in the area of design, none of the
ethico-political and critical designers we work with would claim any expertise in
the area of security studies. Nor would these designers necessarily appreciate all of
the ways their work occasionally interrupts traditional and even new ‘security
dialogues’. So it is just as hit and miss that ethico-political and critical designers
might direct their attention to traditional, critical, and new ‘security issues’ as it is
that traditional, critical and new security scholars might stumble upon the insights
of ethico-political and critical designers to help them ‘replace the existing normal’
in terms of what security studies is supposed to do. The challenge, then, is to create
a new, sustained dialogue among ethico-political and critical designers and security
studies scholars and practitioners so that they might work together to influence
public policy agendas that claim to ‘design out insecurity’ and ‘design in
protection’ now and in the future and to expose dangerous contradictions bound
up in these security agendas.
One of the ways we are taking up this challenge is by developing a new
approach to security studies, what we call Redesigning Security. A Redesigning
Security Approach combines the insights of new security studies and the insights
of ethico-political and critical design to rethink the security/technology relationship
in ways that may influence security policy. More specifically, it involves three
moves: (1) interrupting the conventional conversation about security by broadening
who takes part in this conversation; (2) identifying new research questions that
emerge from this conversation and, (3) combining new security studies insights and
63 This is a typical error message at comes up when using a computer, and it is also the title of designer
Fiona Raby’s presentation at the Lancaster University Institute for Advanced Studies’ Annual
Programme Year Conference on ‘New Sciences of Protection: Designing Safe Living’, Lancaster
(10–12 July 2008).
64 Fiona Raby, ‘Do you want to replace the existing normal?’ Keynote address delivered at the
Lancaster University Institute for Advanced Studies Annual Programme Year conference on ‘New
Sciences of Protection: Designing Safe Living’, Lancaster (10–12 July 2008).
65 Burgess, The Handbook of New Security Studies.
66 See: {http://www.lancs.ac.uk/ias/annualprogramme/protection/} and {http://safeliving.wordpress.
com/}.
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ethico-political and critical design practices and research methods/attitudes as a
way to explore these new research questions. We will elaborate on each of these
moves in turn.
Conversations about security tend to be limited to social/political science
academics, government policymakers working directly on security issues, and
scientists developing technologies that may be deployed to solve security problems.
Occasionally, stakeholders like ‘the public’ or corporations are included. Our
conversation about redesigning security draws upon these and three additional
groups – (1) academics working on critical organisational management, critical
science/technology studies, and critical humanities studies; (2) critical policy
analysts working for independent public policy Think Tanks and, (3) design
practitioners who understand themselves to be doing ethico-politically-motivated
design or to be employing ‘critical design’ methods/attitudes in their practice of
design. What these additional conversationalists add are alternative perspectives on
what politics is and how it is practiced. These dialogues also broaden the resources
we draw upon to re-imagine and therefore rethink what security is, what
technology is, what design is, and what the security/technology/design relationship
should be, particular on behalf of states and citizens. They do this through
references to aspects of the ‘real world’ that traditional security studies scholars,
analysts, and practitioners often neglect and through references to ‘other worlds’
in film, literature, art, music, and performance.
What is emerging from this refigured conversation are a range of research
questions that are markedly diﬀerent to those found in traditional, critical and new
security studies because they require us to rethink security, technology and design
separately and together. These questions are:
1. What products, services and assemblages are designers, scientists and policy-
makers imagining and proposing in order to ‘design out’ insecurity and ‘design
in’ protection’?
2. How can we begin to use alternative practices and methods/attitudes – such as
‘critical design’ – to imagine how these new products, services, and systems will
be used and (mis)used in the near future and to potentially interrupt and/or
redirect these future applications of new technologies?
3. What are the ethico-political implications of these attempts to ‘design out’
insecurity and ‘design in protection’?
How we investigate these research questions is by combining new securities
insights with ethico-political and critical design methods/attitudes. As our earlier
discussion pointed out, a new securities perspective oﬀers a number of insights
about the relationships between security and insecurity, security and fear, and
security and politics/ethics. One of the mantras of new security studies is that
attempts to increase security are often also accompanied by increases in insecurity.
At the same time, though, multiplying insecurities can be a policymaking technique
(as we’ve seen in the so-called War on Terror). But it is a policymaking technique
that always threatens to get out of hand. This is because the sorts of fears that
bubble through all of the contemporary circulatory systems we discussed earlier are
explicitly created, directed, containable, and predictable fears as well as unexpected,
misdirected, uncontainable, and unpredictable fears. All responses to these
insecurities and fears – whether we think they make us ‘safe’ or not – have
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ethico-political dimensions that are sometimes diﬃcult to grasp when we are caught
up in them (like the sometimes hidden histories of iris scanning technology in
airport security ‘fast lanes’).67
Much of the work of ethico-political and critical designers engages (either
explicitly or implicitly) the ethico-political issues circulating through contemporary
networks of security and insecurity. What these designers are very good at is
making visible the relationships between security and insecurity through the
production of material objects (like Casa Segura, the Faraday Chair, and MRI
steaks). The reason why these objects are so eﬀective at materialising relationships
between security and insecurity (particularly in the realm of science and tech-
nology) is because these objects embody paradoxes about the circulation of
securities and insecurities through technologies that either exist today (border
patrols, electromagnetic waves) or that are being imagined to secure us in the
future (Homeland Security blankets).
What we are calling ‘ethico-political design’ accomplishes its critique of the
security/technology/design relationship by proposing self-consciously ethical and
political designs that intentionally complicate prevailing knowledge about politics
and the values contained in this political knowledge while (usually) oﬀering
alternative design solutions and/or ethical choices in the face of these political
problems (as Casa Segura does, for example, in relation to the prevailing wisdom
and practice of dealing with illegal immigrants). How what designers Anthony
Dunne and Fiona Raby call ‘critical design’ accomplishes its critique of the
security/technology/design relationship is by standing outside the prevailing know-
ledge about design (that design should oﬀer marketable ‘solutions’ to pre-given
‘problems’). From this position, critical designers are able to design objects that are
themselves questions about the ethico-political values and biases designed into
everyday technologies and their intended uses, as well as questions about the
traditional way of doing design. This position also allows critical designers to
speculate not only about what appears to be normal in the present but also about
what might become normal in the future, especially in relation to new sciences and
technologies. And it also allows them to question how what is normal in the
present is uncritically projected into the future by corporate (and we would add,
state) futurologists.68 On this point, Dunne and Raby argue,
Corporate [and state] futurologists force-feed us a ‘happy-ever-after’ portrayal of life where
technology is the solution to every problem. There is no room for doubt or complexity in
their techno-utopian visions. Everyone is a stereotype, and social and cultural roles remain
unchanged. Despite the fact that technology is evolving, the imagined products that feature
in their fantasies reassure us that nothing essential will change, everything will stay the
same [. . .] The resulting scenarios extend pre-existing reality into the future and so reinforce
the status quo rather than challenging it.69
Rather than buying into these conservative forecasting strategies, Dunne and Raby
explore fantastical future scenarios that often have a bleaker quality, what they
have sometimes referred to as ‘design noir’.70 Of course, futurists and policymakers
67 Katja Jacobsen, ‘Making Design Safe for Living: A Case of Humanitarian Experimentation’,
Citizenship Studies, 14:1 (2010), pp. 89–103.
68 Peter Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises: A survival guide for the 21th century (London: Simon and
Schuster, 2003).
69 Dunne and Raby, Design Noir, p. 6, parentheses added.
70 Dunne and Raby, Design Noir.
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concerned with security also often develop bleak scenarios that stress the need for
innovation to respond to the ‘state of emergency’. Yet what connects the corporate
futurists with security futurists is a concern with designing out insecurity through
technological innovation. Commenting on this practice, Anthony Dunne explains,
If we limit ourselves to only designing the present then the ‘future’ will just happen to us,
and the one we get will be driven by technology and economics. We need to develop ways
of speculating that are grounded in fact yet engage the imagination and allow us to debate
diﬀerent possible futures before they happen. The danger of course is that they become
mere fantasies. So the challenge is how to maintain realism. Maybe it is related to the
suspension of disbelief that filmmakers make use of. The social and ethical implications of
technologies such as biotech and nanotech can only be explored through speculation.71
Unconventional speculation and imagination about the future, then, are among the
most important tools of critical designers. But, as Dunne points out, this
speculation must be grounded in more than mere fantasy. For this reason, Dunne,
Raby and their students in the Royal College of Arts Design Interaction Program
work (critically) with top-notch nano – and material scientists, bioengineers, and
emerging technologists, with corporations like Microsoft and BT, and with
government departments like the Department of Trade and Industry. By ensuring
that the science and technology they engage with is on the drawing board (if not
already in the marketplace) critical designers ‘blur the boundaries between the real
and the fictional, so that the conceptual becomes more real and the real is seen as
just one limited possibility among many’.72 Indeed, the slippage between the real
and the fictional as attempts to secure by design intensify leads to a situation where
critical design not only examines the future of our attempts to control and secure
life but also creates a sense of anxiety and uncertainty as to what is real and what
is fictional in our desire to secure by design, alerting us to our habituation to new
innovations in the securitisation of the body and everyday life.
The results of critical design are objects that both fascinate and alienate, thrill
and repel, aesthetically please and morally repulse. James King’s MRI steaks are
a good example of this. And all of this is, of course, intentional. It is what Fiona
Raby calls ‘the space of dilemma’73 and what we call ‘thinking space’. It is in these
sorts of spaces, through some very unexpected encounters with objects, that we
might create new opportunities to think again about the security/technology/design
relationship.
Conclusion
Theodor Adorno was concerned with the connections between design, the built
environments we live in, and the political. In Minima Moralia: Reflections on a
Damaged Life, Adorno comments, in an extract that is worth quoting at length:
Do not knock – Technology is making gestures precise and brutal, and with them men. It
expels from movements all hesitation, deliberation, civility. It subjects them to the
71 Dunne quoted in David Womack, ‘Uncertain Futures: A Conversation with Professor Anthony
Dunne’, Think Tank (21 February 2007), {http://www.adobe.com/designcenter/thinktank/dunne_02.
html} accessed on 1 July 2009.
72 Dunne and Raby, Design Noir, p. 65.
73 Raby, ‘Do You Want to Replace the Existing Normal?’
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implacable, as it were ahistorical demands of objects. Thus the ability is lost, for example,
to close a door quietly and discreetly, yet firmly. Those of cars and refrigerators have to be
slammed, others have the tendency to snap shut by themselves, imposing on those entering
the bad manners of not looking behind them, not shielding the interior of the house which
receives them. The new human type cannot be properly understood without awareness of
what he is continuously exposed to from the world of things around him, even in his most
secret innervations. What does it mean for the subject that there are no more casement
windows open, but only sliding frames to shove, no gentle latches but turnable handles, no
forecourt, no doorstep before the street, no wall around the garden? And which driver is
not tempted, merely by the power of his engine to, to wipe out the vermin of the street,
pedestrians, children and cyclists? The movements machines demand of their users already
have the violent, hard-hitting, unresting jerkiness of Fascist Maltreatment.74
To be sure, the connections Adorno makes between the design of windows,
refrigerators, doors and fascism is perhaps overstated. But the point that Adorno
is making is an important one. Updating Adorno’s concerns, we might ask about
today’s world: What is the ‘new human type’ that emerges from worlds where the
password is a thumbprint on a biometric border located not just at a border
between sovereign nation-states but in a school or a bank or on the surface of an
MP3 player? What ‘new human type’ emerges from worlds in which our ‘body
armor’ is not only knife proof but networked, where we look for the most playful
attempts to tag our children, where a designer bicycle helmet is modelled on a
futuristic fighter pilot’s helmet, where we travel in vehicles designed with a rugged
and militaristic aesthetic of protection? Immersed in attempts to secure by design,
what type of encounter with the world are we ‘new human types’ already prepared
for? What does this mean for our sense of living with others? And what do future
plans for securing by design tell us about our current political fears and desires?
These are the question that a new generation of designers is examining. These
are diﬃcult and often disturbing questions to explore, and some of the designs
produced to explore these questions themselves have the ability to disturb and
unsettle because of how they imagine the realisation and implementation of future
technologies. The disturbing nature of critical design work in particular, like that
of Dunne and Raby, is intensified by the fact it has been displayed in exhibitions
in major museums and galleries that can verge on a celebration of new design
solutions to address the insecurities of contemporary life. This point comes through
in a New York Times review on MoMA’s Design and the Elastic Mind titled ‘The
Soul in the New Machines’. In it, Nicolai Ouroussoﬀ celebrates the exhibition,
commenting that ‘[t]he results can be scary, but they may also hold the key to
paradise’.75 In an obvious reference to the section that showcases the work of
Dunne and Raby and their students, the critic writes, ‘If the show has a weakness,
it’s when it introduces artsy expressions of futuristic societies that tend to be
technologically crude: images of heavy plastic tubes that potential sexual mates can
use to sniﬀ each other, for example, or robots that refuse to respond until they are
lavished with aﬀection.’76
As this review suggest, amidst all the wonderful design solutions to make life
better, the work on ‘design for debate’ can appear to be out of place. Yet this
74 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on A Damaged Life (London: Verso, 2005), p. 19.
75 Nicolai Ouroussoﬀ, ‘The Soul in the New Machines’, The New York Times (22 February 2008),
{http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/arts/design/22elas.html} accessed on 1 July 2009.
76 Ouroussoﬀ, ‘The Soul in the New Machines’.
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is precisely what makes this work so powerful. For its very purpose is to show
how the future will exceed mainstream forecasts about how technology can be
mobilised to solve human problems. It does this by revealing a disturbing
‘otherness’ that lurks within technology and our uses of it and that reminds us
that rapid technological changes rarely unfold in linear, predictable fashions that
can be controlled by humans. Instead, it underscores how technology changes
not only our senses of security and insecurity, but our sense of self, pointing
toward ‘new human types’ that might be generated from human/technology
interactions.
This work has important implications for security agendas that attempt to
secure by design. For by making tangible the limits of human control and
technological progress, critical designs reminds us of the limits of policy agendas
that promise to ‘design out insecurities’ and ‘design in protection’. What’s more,
critical designs shows how designers potentially figure so crucially in transforming
unpalatable, untested technologies into palatable, reassuring design solutions. In so
doing, critical designs alert us to how designs and designers can be co-opted and
put in the service of states and corporations by, for example, designing more
acceptable and tasteful forms of control that can be integrated into our daily lives
as designs for ‘safe living’ and by designing ‘new human types’ who more easily
accept emerging forms of control.
Our goal in proposing a Redesigning Security Approach to an exploration of
the security/technology/design relationship is to combine the ‘very concrete and
Image 4. Photograph taken by Mark Lacy at Venezia Santa Lucia train station in April 2009.
1042 Cynthia Weber and Mark Lacy
down to earth language’ of design77 – a language articulated mostly through
material objects – with the insights of new security studies in ways that make
visible the troubling conundrums bound up in securing by design. We recognise the
potential for politics-as-usual to absorb the critiques oﬀered by ethico-political and
critical design and for design to shy away from doing politics. Indeed, provocative
design can be used to mobilise debate within existing political discourse, like this
large series of warning signs declaring ‘Which security is enough security?’ (see
Image 4) created by the EU to mobilise interest in elections, and, as the graﬃti
response to this sign highlights (‘that of the dictator’), opens up a debate that its
planners may not have intended. Yet at a time when policymakers, futurists and
designers are often seduced by the promise of securing by design, our engagements
with ethico-political and critical design open up alternative ways of interacting with
technology and design, potentially transforming us from policy analysts who
uncritically rely upon the latest technology to solve our security problems into
‘scout[s] sent on ahead to see if the water is drinkable or not’.78
77 Dunne quoted in Womack, ‘Uncertain Futures’.
78 J. G. Ballard, quoted in Diane Johnson, ‘J. G. Ballard: The Glow of the Prophet’, The New York
Review of Books, 55:15 (9 October 2008), p. 25.
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